We assess the effects of changes in household size on the long-run evolution of living standards and on cross-country convergence. When the observed changes in average household size across countries are taken into consideration, growth in living standards is slower throughout the 20th century as compared to a measure based on per capita GDP. Furthermore, the speed of divergence between different countries before 1950 is faster and the speed of convergence after 1950 is slower after adjusting for the evolution in household size.
Introduction
If average household size changes over time, there are obvious implications for the long-run evolution of living standards and for cross-country convergence. Large households generate economies of scale (Deaton and Paxson, 1998; Ravaillon, 2016) such that measuring the well-being of a large household in terms of income per member leads to a downward bias as compared to smaller households with the same income per member. Since rich countries tend to have smaller households than poorer countries (Bradbury et al., 2014) , a similar effect distorts the measure of cross-country dispersion in living standards. While studies on the evolution of inequality have incorporated these insights into their theoretical models and empirical analyzes (see, for example, Burkhauser et al., 2012) , the macroeconomic literature has not yet taken a full account of the size-related heterogeneity of households.
Rather, it has conserved a focus on per capita GDP which may not adequately reflect the actual evolution of living standards within countries (economic growth) and the actual dispersion in living standards across countries (convergence).
In this paper, we use two different measures to address this issue and to gauge the quantitative importance of the effect: income per household and income per adult equivalent. Using the income data from the Maddison (2010) dataset for the 20th century, we show that our adjustments to the denominator lead to slower growth rates than in case of per capita incomes with the difference being roughly 1/3. The reason is that, as per capita incomes have been growing, household size has been declining. This is due to various demographic changes such as declining fertility, the trend to single households, and increasing divorce rates. As a consequence, economies of scale with respect to household size have weakened over time. In our second contribution, we assess the effects of accounting for the size heterogeneity of households on cross-country convergence dynamics.
We find that, once adjusted for household size, the pace of divergence between different countries from 1890 to around 1950 is faster, while the pace of convergence after 1950 is slower than in case of per capita incomes.
The data
We use the GDP data of Maddison (2010) for Australia, Canada, England, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States between 1890 and 2000. To construct the household and the adult equivalent series, we use the data from Bradbury et al. (2014) on changing household size. Following Buhmann et al. (1988) , Citro et al. (1995) , and Geloso et al. (2016) , we use the square root of the number of household members as the adult equivalence scale.
The number of the household members exhibits several features that are worth mentioning (see Figure 1) : the downward trend is observed for all countries; yet the differences between countries seem to be persistent. While the average household size has decreased from 5.1 members to 2.7 members from 1890 to 2000, the gaps between country values did 2 not vanish. The reasons for the decline in household size are mainly the increase in the marriage age and in the divorce rate such that there is a trend to single-person households (see OECD, 2011, p. 19 ) and the ongoing fertility transition towards having fewer but better educated children (Galor, 2005) .
These demographic developments have substantial implications (see Figure 2 as an illustration for the US): GDP per capita is lower than GDP per household and GDP per adult equivalent. However, GDP per capita has a steeper upward trend than GDP per household and GDP per adult equivalent because -for the latter two -the denominator has decreased over time. Consequently, the differences in household size affect the distribution of available resources among households and have implications for the long-run evolution of well-being as well as for its dispersion between countries. 
Main results
One of the two central implications of considering changing household size can be observed with respect to the economic growth (see Table 1 ): for GDP per household and GDP per adult equivalent, the growth rates are substantially lower. Given that the number of households increased faster than the overall population, this is to be expected for the former. The latter suggests that there were reductions in economies of scale that mitigated the actual increase in living standards. Over the whole time period, the difference between growth rates in GDP per capita, GDP per household, and GDP per adult equivalent amounts to 1-1.35 percentage points. Next, we focus on income dispersion (see Figure 3 ). From our previous results, it follows that there are differences in the levels and in the trends when we account for the differential evolution of household size. In so doing, we follow Kufenko et al. (2017) and start with the structural break test of Bai and Perron (2003) , where we set the minimal size of segments to 30 and the number of structural breaks to one. The Bai-Perron test yields 1942 as the initial breakpoint.
Based on this result, we perform a segmented regression as in Muggeo (2003 Muggeo ( , 2008 . This procedure yields a final value of the breakpoint of 1949 for the per capita populationweighted coefficient of variation (see Kufenko et al., 2017) . For the per household and the per adult equivalent series, the breakpoint coincides in the year 1953. 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Time The slope estimates confirm the findings from the visual inspection: before the estimated breakpoint, the slope is positive, implying divergence; after the breakpoint, the slope is negative, implying convergence. For the per capita series, Table 2 resembles the findings of Kufenko et al. (2017) . However, it appears that divergence is more pronounced 
Conclusions
We assess the effects of changes in the size of average households on long-run economic growth and on the cross-country dispersion of living standards. We show that economic growth is slower over the 20th century when appropriate adjustments for changes in household size are made. Furthermore, the dispersion in living standards is underestimated when relying on per capita income. Finally, the per capita figures overestimate the speed of convergence after around 1950 and underestimate the speed of divergence prior to that point.
6
Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences 
